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THE RISE OF CHINA: NARRATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND CIVILIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE 
WEST  
David Garciandía Igal1 
 
 
Abstract: A new world emerges to the detriment of the unipolar world led so 
far by the United States. In this context, what the new global order will look 
like, due to China's growing influence in the international arena, is a major 
topic of discussion for internationalists. The debate is mainly based on two 
alternative standpoints: China will adapt itself to the international system or 
China will build a new one according to its own values and norms. The aim 
of this research is to trace the line between (1) the narratives and debates on 
China's rise, and (2) the civilizational differences between the Asian country 
and the West, thus providing a framework for identifying possible ways in 
which China could impact the international system. 
Palavras-chaves: China, rise, international system, global order. 
 
A ASCENSÃO DA CHINA: NARRATIVAS NAS RELAÇÕES 
INTERNACIONAIS E DIFERENÇAS CIVILIZACIONAIS COM O 
OESTE 
 
Resumo: Um novo mundo emerge em detrimento do mundo unipolar 
liderado até agora pelos Estados Unidos. Neste contexto, como será a nova 
ordem global, devido à crescente influência da China na arena internacional, 
é um tema de discussão importante para os internacionalistas. O debate 
baseia-se principalmente em dois pontos de vista alternativos: A China irá 
adaptar-se ao sistema internacional ou a China irá construir um novo de 
acordo com os seus próprios valores e normas. O objetivo desta investigação 
é traçar a linha entre (1) as narrativas e debates sobre a ascensão da China, e 
(2) as diferenças civilizacionais entre o país asiático e o Ocidente, 
proporcionando assim um quadro para identificar possíveis formas de a China 
poder ter impacto no sistema internacional. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
After World War II, the world was divided into two main blocs. On the one hand, the 
United States of America (USA) leading Capitalism. On the other hand, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) leading Communism. The West, with the USA as its reference, 
constructed an architecture of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) or the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). This international system fosters a specific view of the State and human beings. 
Societies should be is based on three pillars: (1) In politics, the establishment of Democracy 
and the Rule of Law; (2) In economics, the development of Capitalism as the economic system; 
(3) In morals, the respect and promotion of Human Rights. This Democracy & Rule of Law - 
Capitalism - Human Rights paradigm has been the model for most developing and developed 
countries since then. 
Moreover, after the dissolution of the USSR in the 1980s and 1990s, the world became 
unipolar. Those mentioned international organizations enjoyed great prominence since the end 
of the Cold War and constituted the international system that has been joined by almost all 
countries in the world. Apparently, there was no alternative for the Western model. This period, 
which has been called “Pax Americana”, allowed the USA (and, to a less extent, some European 
countries and Japan) to shape the international order and deal with the most relevant 
international affairs at they please. However, this time seems to have passed. With the rise of 
China and the increasing presence of other countries in the international arena, such as Russia, 
a profound shift of power from the West to the East is taking place.  
In this context, the aim of this research is simple: To compile and synthesize the main 
current narratives about China’s rise and trace the line with the main civilizational differences 
between China and the West. What are the differences between China and the West and, 
applying those international relations narratives, how can these differences help us to figure out 
the future of the international system? In trying to answer this question, the reader will be 
confronted with open questions and given key elements to suggest possible future paths of the 
current international system. It is not the goal of this paper to provide definitive answers to the 
questions that will be raised, but rather to link the narratives and debates on China's rise to the 
civilizational differences between the Asian country and the West, thus creating a framework 
that allows the reader to better understand the ways in which China could alter the global order. 
For this purpose, the study is structured around three main edges. First, a brief 
introduction to China’s recent history and economic development. Second, the analysis of 
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China’s rise through (i) the main current debates and narratives in international relations, (ii) 
China’s new pro-active foreign policy, and (iii) China’s traditional vision on international 
relations (how the ‘Tributary system’ differs from the Westphalian system). Third, the study of 
some main civilizational differences with the West, focusing especially in (i) the notion of State, 
(ii) its relationship with society and (iii) the role of rights and freedoms. 
These ideas have been studied under a multidisciplinary approach, due to the nature of 
the debates and the issues involved. The reader will find concepts from International Relations, 
Law or Economy. Under the descriptive method, an extensive review of academic research 
(books and articles), political official discourses, specialized press, and reports from 
international organizations and foundations, has been conducted. In addition, quantitative 
analysis of existing data provided by international organizations, private companies and other 
international entities, has been used in order to illustrate qualitative arguments. 
 
II. Recent history of China: Political turbulences and economic development 
 
The 20th century has been one of the most turbulent in China’s recent history. After the 
Boxer Rebellion (拳亂), China was a defeated and humiliated Imperial State with overwhelming 
internal and external conflicts. This situation led to the Xinhai Revolution (辛亥革命), which 
finished with 2.000 years of imperial governance in China after the abdication of Puyi (溥仪), 
last Chinese Emperor. The new Republic of China (中華民國) was born under the leadership of 
Sun Yat-sen (孙中山) and Chiang Kai-shek (蔣中正), both representatives of the Kuomintang (国民
党), the Chinese Nationalist Party (see FAIRBANK, 2014).  
Nonetheless, in 1921 the Communist Party of China (中国共产党, CPC) was established. Its 
popularity grew rapidly and, in 1924, a civil war between communists and nationalists started. 
This conflict lasted until the 30s, when it cooled down to focus on the Second Sino-Japanese 
War (中国抗日战争). After the Japanese defeat, civil war continued. Eventually, Mao Zedong (毛泽
东) proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1st October 1949. The Kuomintang get 
into exile in Taiwan (台湾), controlling the island until our days. Taiwan still claim the authentic 
legitimacy of the Government of the Republic of China. As a result of these events, Taiwan is 
still nowadays in an extremely complicated diplomatic and geopolitical situation with an 
uncertain future2 (see EBERHARD, 2004).  
 
2 Taiwan was considered as a full Member State in the United Nations until 1971, when it was replaced by the 
People’s Republic of China. In 2019, only 15 States continue recognizing Taiwan as the legitime Republic of 
China.  
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After the triumph of the Communist Revolution (解放战争) in 1949 (Called ‘War of 
Liberation’ by the communists, and ‘National Protection War against the Communist 
Rebellion’ by the nationalists), the CPC’s dictatorship began. The first major challenge was the 
Korean War, where China joined the North Korea-USSR alliance. After the 1953 armistice, 
China's relations with the USSR improved. Indeed, the soviet regime collaborated in the 
elaboration of China’s First Five-Year Plan (五年计划). However, despite the initial economic 
takeoff, serious problems appeared in the development model. In order to address this issue, 
Mao designed a campaign known as the Great Leap Forward (大跃进). Its aims were to increase 
production and to strengthen communist values. Nevertheless, the outcome was terrible, with 
millions of deaths and devastating consequences, both economically and socially3. This point 
represented a shift in the Sino-Soviet relations. Moreover, relations continue deteriorating over 
time, eventually breaking down after the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命). This period has a 
transcendental significance in the history of modern China, since it was an internally convulsive 
era that ended the isolation policy.  
After Mao’s death in 1976, the Chinese regime followed an opening process in almost all 
fields and an approach to the West. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), the economy 
experienced a period of modernization and development. The so-called Four Modernizations (
四个现代化) were goals focused on strengthening agriculture, industry, defense, and science and 
technology. From this moment, China has transitioned from a State dominated planned socialist 
economy to a mixed market socialist economy (see NAUGHTON, 2006).  
This reform period has allowed China to experience one of the most impressive economic 
developments in human history. “In the 1980s, China was an impoverished backwater, 
struggling to escape the political turmoil and economic mismanagement of the Mao era” 
(KROEBER, 2016, p. 324). However, today is the largest economy in the world in terms of 
GDP PPP, the largest manufacturing and trading country, it consumes half of the steel and coal 
available in the world, and it is the biggest source of international tourists and one of the most 
important investors in developing countries (see KROEBER, 2016).  
The average GDP growth rate during the last four decades has increased by nearly 10% 
(see Figure 1). We could compare this fact with another extraordinary economic development 
period: The Industrial Revolution in England. However, the British income growth rate between 
1770-1815 was 1.7%, and between 1815-1841 it was 3.4% (HARLEY, 1982, p. 271). As we 
 
3 Available data on the number of deaths varied substantially depending on the studies. However, the majority of 
them agree on the range between the 20 to 50 million deaths. See, for example, research conducted by authors 
such as F. Dikötter or R. J. Rummel. 
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can observe, the national income growth was lower during the first decades of the Industrial 
Revolution than during the last ones (WILLIAMSON, 1984, p. 688-689). Even more, when the 
United States developed its industry between 1889 and 1919, the GNP annual growth rate 
increased by 4% (KENDRICK, 1961, p. 79), however, this trend breaks around 1910 
(VATTER, WALKER e ALPEROVITZ, 1995, p. 591). Both historical examples are far from 
the Chinese growth rate between 1976 and 2018, as Figure 1 shows.  
 
 
Figure 1. China’s GDP Growth Evolution (1976 – 2018)  
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data supplied by the World Bank. 
 
  
The comparison between the GDP of China and India since 1990 is also very 
representative. At that moment, both economies had a similar size. Whereas China had a GDP 
(measured by current US $) of 360.858 billion, India had 320.979 billion. Nevertheless, only 
28 years later, China’s GDP is almost five times that of India (13.608 billion vs. 2.726 billion) 
(see Figure 2). This disparity highlights the unparalleled growth of China. Many causes explain 
this difference. However, it is not the aim of this study to analyse them. The point is only to 
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Figure 2. GDP Evolution of China and India (1990 – 2018)  
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data supplied by the World Bank.  
 
Other interesting comparison could be done between China’s GDP PPP and that of the 
USA (see Figure 3). The surprising result we obtain is that China surpassed the USA in 2014. 
We could say that, gauging economic power through this specific measure, China is already the 
world’s first economic power. Although it is true that there are other indicators (such as GDP 
with constant 2010 US $, or GDP with current US $) were the USA is still on top, empirical 
evidence clearly suggests that Chinese economy has come to stay. Especially, China has 
bridged the gap with the USA after the 2008 economic crisis, whose effects have had little 
impact on the Chinese economy compared to Western countries. Much has been written on the 
effects of the 2008 Crisis on China’s economy. However, despite the fact that China’s large 
stimulus programme has partially offset negative effects on its economy, undoubtedly the 
global recession generated by the 2008 financial crisis has hit fairly hard to Chinese economy 
(see LI, WILLETT & ZHANG, 2012).  
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that China is still far from the USA GDP per capita 
level (see Figure 4). Although China’s GDP PPP per capita without the purchasing parity power 
effect is not so far from that of the USA, taking in account this effect, the USA GDP per capita 
is 6.4 times larger than the Chinese one. This could represent the possibility for China to keep 
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Figure 3. GDP PPP Evolution of China and the USA 




Figure 4. GDP per capita evolution of China and the USA 
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data supplied by the World Bank. 
  
Some authors highlight numerous uncertainties in the economic model of China. The 
largest danger has been, and remains, the level of dependence on trade, which makes China 
vulnerable to external affairs. In this sense, the trade war initiated with the USA could produce 
negative effects. Other concerns have been raised, such as environmental issues, regional 
imbalances, banking viability (JUNEJA, 2015), frozen domestic real estate market, local 
government debt, collapse of non-bank capital markets and public stock markets, or RMB value 
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technological progress could represent another limitation (see MONSHIPOURI, WELCH JR. 
& CRUZ, 2011). 
 
III. China’s rise: Compromising the established world order? 
 
III.1. Recent debates and narratives in international relations 
 
As the above data show, the People’s Republic of China has experienced one of the largest 
and fastest economic developments in History over the last forty years. The Asian country has 
the largest population in the world, the largest GDP (PPP) in the world, the largest standing 
army in the world, the largest political party in the world, a manned space programme and a 
nuclear arsenal. In addition, it is the third largest country in terms of territorial extension, it has 
a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Mandarin Chinese is one of the 
six official languages of the UN and it has a growing influence on different regions and 
international organizations. It is clear that China has risen (CALLAHAN, 2005, p. 701).  
The assumption that a unipolar world has passed is becoming widely accepted in 
International Relations, although we still do not have an extended theory of unipolarity (see 
MONTEIRO, 2014). Nonetheless, it seems clear that a profound shift of power from the West 
to the East is taking place. Indeed, we are not experiencing a shift but a re-shift: the world was 
mostly Eastern (in terms of population, production, trade or technology) before the dawn of 
industrialization (see POMERANZ, 2000). To this extent, the world is returning to what it 
always was: an Asian centric world. In this regard, one of the current debates is based on 
whether we are moving towards a multipolar world (with different superpowers competing with 
each other) or towards a non-polar world (where several regional powers coexist without 
colliding with each other). 
Over the last decades, whether China would become a superpower or not used to be one 
of the main debates in International Relations. However, this debate is not alive anymore since 
China is already considered a superpower in the international arena (see FISHMAN, 2006). The 
current debate is to what extent is China going to change the world as we know it. What role 
would China play in the future as a superpower? Would China engage in the pre-stablished 
world order or would it create a new one? How is the new relationship between the West and 
China going to be? If China does create a new world order, would the current world powers 
lose their privileged positions? These are some of the main questions that constitute the current 
debate around China's rise. In this scenario, some authors have highlighted the necessity of 
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containing the rise of China (see SHAMBAUGH, 1996), while others accept that the USA 
cannot stop China's ascendance but it can encourage China exercises its power within the rules 
and institutions that the USA and other Western powers have created during the last decades, 
believing that the international system can be maintained (see IKENBERRY, 2008). In 
addition, there are those who argue that the shift in power is a natural and unstoppable process 
(see JACQUES, 2012), while other scholars are less sure about China's inevitable hegemony 
(see FENBY, 2014; CALLAHAN 2012, 2013). Chinese scholars also joined this debate and 
different concepts, such as ‘responsible power’, ‘great power diplomacy’ or ‘China's peaceful 
rise’, were created. In this sense, for example, in the speech ‘Turning Your Eyes to China’, at 
Harvard University on 10th December 2003, ex-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao argued that while 
Euro-American States used violence to expand their empires, China is using “scientific and 
technological progress to solve the problems of resources and the environment. Here lies the 
essence of China’s road of peaceful rise and development.” The logic under the creation of this 
concepts is to counter arguments that show modern China as a threat (CALLAHAN, 2005, p. 
702).  
To summarize these narratives under an International Relations theoretical framework, 
the debate is between offensive realists who argue that China is going to challenge the current 
global order (see MEARSHEIMER, 2010, 2014; KAGAN 2015), and liberal internationalists 
who suggest that, even though global leading position may pass to Beijing, the international 
liberal system will resist (see IKENBERRY, 2018; FOOT, 2019; HURRELL, 2006). In other 
words, the ongoing debate is explained from two different approaches: the pessimistic one and 
the optimistic one. Whilst the first one argues that China would profoundly alter the 
international standards (citing South China Sea’s conflicts, the expansion of Chinese state-
controlled firms, or the new Belt and Road Initiative), the second one supports the idea that 
China is adapting itself to the Western order (as evidenced by China’s membership of the WTO 
or its increasing cooperative attitude in the UN Security Council) (KACZMARSKI, 2016, p. 
9). 
However, over the last years, “optimism has been replaced with pessimism and fears of 
‘China’s assertiveness’ and of rising Chinese-American rivalry” in Western international 
forums (KACZMARSKI, 2016, p. 9-10). An increasing uncertainty on Chinese affairs is 
growing in Western thinking. More and more Western authors are skeptical about the rise of 
China and the possible negative consequences of it (ultimately, war). Nevertheless, some people 
inside the PRC, with Xi Jinping (习近平) among them, argue that China will not fall into the 
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‘Thucydides's trap’4. This theory states that when one power rises, it challenges the existing 
world order. And, when one power threatens to displace another, conflict is almost always the 
result (see ALLISON, 2017a). Nonetheless, other Chinese authors and leaders argue that China 
has the moral duty to model global institutions to better represent the interests of emerging 
powers and the non-West, somehow challenging the peaceful narrative.  
Notwithstanding this fact, how is that global order that seems to be challenged? After 
World War II, the world was divided into two main blocs led on the one hand by the USA, and 
on the other hand by the USSR. However, the fall and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s and the 1990s resulted in a unipolar world. This was the so-called “Pax 
Americana” period, which allowed the USA (and Europe and Japan to a less extent) to establish 
its vision of the world. This Western world view steams from a structure of international 
organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or 
the World Trade Organization. These institutions, which have enjoyed great prominence in the 
world configuration since the end of the Cold War (CHICHARRO, 2017, p. 30), constitute the 
international system that has been joined by almost all countries in the world. Nevertheless, 
“these postwar institutions did not simply solve functional problems or facilitate cooperation” 
but they have also been mechanisms for the West “to lock other states into a favorable set of 
postwar relations and establish some measure of restraint on its own exercise of power” 
(IKENBERRY, 2000, pp 4-5). And, in addition to international institutions, this post-Cold War 
order has been reinforced by America’s soft power through more subtle ways, such as films, 
music or the media (see RUIXUE, XIULING & LI, 2016). 
This global order supports and fosters a unique vision of humankind and society. This 
vision on how societies should be is based on three pillars: (1) In politics, the establishment of 
Democracy and Rule of Law; (2) In economics, the development of Capitalism as the economic 
system; (3) In relation to values, the respect and promotion of Human Rights (SOLANA, 2014). 
This Democracy & Rule of Law - Capitalism - Human Rights paradigm has been the model for 
developed and developing countries. However, could this paradigm morph due to the rise of 
China? Would China actively encourage a different type of model for developing countries? 
What would that model look like? Within the above-mentioned broad debate on China's rise, 
these specific questions are some of the most relevant. China, as the rest of great powers, could 
 
4 This concept was coined by Graham T. Allison (1940), Harvard professor, to describe the situation where a rising 
power challenges an established dominant power. This circumstance usually ends in conflict between both powers. 
The term is taken from Thycydides, an Athenian historian and general that wrote ‘The History of the Peloponnesian 
War’, where he described the series of wars between Athens and Sparta with its subsequent change in the balance 
of power in Greece.  
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“see the world in terms of its own history and values, and seek to shape the world in accordance 
with them” (JACQUES, 2012, p. 334). However, to what extent or in which direction would 
China change the Democracy & Rule of Law - Capitalism - Human Rights paradigm is a matter 
of controversy that only time will clarify.  
One of the key points in this discussion is the relationship between politics and economy 
in China’s foreign policy. Unlike the European Union (EU), China do not vividly promote its 
values through trade5. In this sense, China wish to establish and strength trade links irrespective 
of politics. Some could say that the PRC is more respectful than the EU, due to the fact that the 
former does not usually interfere in internal affairs while trading. Nevertheless, others could 
argue the contrary: China trades with everyone, regardless of their circumstances, and is not 
ashamed to trade with despotic States. However, whatever approach we take, what is clear is 
that China has increased its trade relations, growing its market shares in countries along the 
New Silk Road, “while European Member States have both lost market shares and even seen 
their exports shrink in absolute terms” (HOLSLAG, 2017). As a result, the EU's scope for 
promoting values through trade is shrinking, as its position of strength in world terms, at least 
in relation to China, is declining.  
Notwithstanding this fact, in order to change the Democracy & Rule of Law - Capitalism 
- Human Rights paradigm, China would require at least two main successive conditions: First, 
to create a new architecture of international organizations based on different values. Second, to 
promote Chinese values and China’s society model among developing countries through its 
international influence (which lies in different sources, such as those new international 
organizations, the so-called soft power or trade pressure). Some authors  (YU, 2017, p. 360) 
defend that China is following a joint strategy in this regard. On the one hand, China is creating 
a new international architecture (with the establishment of organizations such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Bank or the Silk Road Fund). And, at the same time, China is working together 
with emerging countries such as the BRICS to reform the existing one. However, even if this 
strategy eventually shifts the international system to the East, the second condition would still 
be necessary. China would have to exercise a kind of attraction power towards developing 
countries. The likelihood of this possibility is low, due to the fact that Chinese civilization 
conceive itself as superior to the rest of regions in the world. This Sinocentric view entails an 
 
5 One of the most important aspects of the European Union’s trade policy, at least in theory, is the promotion of 
its principles and values through trade. As stated in the Treaty on European Union (art. 2) and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Preamble), these values are: Human Dignity, Freedom, Democracy, 
Equality, Rule of Law and Human Rights.  
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autarchic and isolationist attitude towards external cultures (JACQUES, 2012, p. 92). Under 
this traditional Chinese idea, there is no point in crossing the borders of the Middle Kingdom 
and interfere in internal affairs of third countries. Nevertheless, different situation would be that 
were the developing countries imitate motu propio China’s society model, instead of the 
Democracy & Rule of Law - Capitalism - Human Rights paradigm. In this scenario, the future 
of this paradigm would be uncertain.  
 
III.2. China’s new foreign policy 
 
It is clear that the new proactive foreign policy established by Xi Jinping represents the 
end of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘bide and hide’ strategy. The current Chinese leader has changed 
China’s approach towards international relations as hitherto applied. After largely centralizing 
power in his person, he has abandoned two basic principles followed by the country since the 
late 1970s. In domestic politics, China has rejected the ‘collective leadership’ principle, which 
represented the division of decision-capacity and shared responsibility among members of the 
Standing Committee of the CPC. In international affairs, China has renounced to the ‘keeping 
a low profile’ principle, which meant a not-highly involvement in international affairs 
(KACZMARSKI, 2016, p. 10). “The grand strategy is ambitious: to use economic leverage to 
build a Sinocentric ‘community of shared destiny’ in Asia, which in turn will make China a 
normative power that sets the rules of the game for global governance” (CALLAHAN, 2016, 
p. 3).  
This change in China’s foreign relations is clearly appreciated in different facts: the role 
taken by the Chinese Government in combating climate change, the proactive involvement in 
diplomatic forums such as the UN, the prolific tours of Xi Jinping in numerous countries, the 
increase of foreign investment in China, the actions taken in the East and South China Seas 
(especially, the establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone and the creation of 
artificial islands), the foundation and promotion of multilateral economic institutions (Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank or BRICS Development Bank) and security institutions 
(Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia), the development of 
the most ambitious project for the 21st century, the Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路 ) 
(KACZMARSKI, 2016, p. 11-12), or the recent leader's role performed in the coronavirus 
crisis.  
This new narrative has been presented through different slogans such as ‘rejuvenation of 
the great Chinese nation’, ‘China dream’, ‘Asia dream’, ‘new type of relationships between 
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powers’, ‘win-win cooperation’ or ‘new concept of security in Asia’. Some of these expressions 
are result of Xi Jinping’s aim to introduce his own personal glossary, as past leaders used to do 
decades ago. Others are too general and have just propaganda intention, although some of them 
show a Sinocentric view of the world, involving a suggestion to change international relations 
(KACZMARSKI, 2016, p. 14).  
One of the most important ideas in this new form of foreign policy is the ‘peripheral 
diplomacy’ strategy (see CALLAHAN, 2016). This concept embraces not only diplomacy, but 
also economic, cultural and security aspects. The key idea is to deepen friendly relations with 
neighboring countries through economic cooperation and the building of closer security ties 
(see XI, 2018). This approach grants more importance to relationships with neighbors than with 
specific powers (KACZMARSKI, 2016, p. 14), and represents an important shift in Chinese 
foreign policy. The main goal for Mao Zedong was national liberation and world revolution. 
For Deng Xiaoping, the aim was to develop domestic economy whilst guaranteeing the survival 
of communist party leadership. He established a second-line approach in world affairs that was 
followed by Jiang Zemin (江泽民) and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛). Both of them focused Chinese foreign 
policy more on the West and on the ‘China going global’ or ‘Go Out Policy’ (走出去战略) than on 
neighboring States (see SHAMBAUGH, 2014). However, Xi Jinping wants to create “an 
alternative notion of regional order”, due to tensions (especially, maritime conflicts in the East 
and South China Seas) with its neighbor States (CALLAHAN, 2016, p. 7). Although this 
strategy seeks to remodel regional areas, this could represent a starting point for a global 
horizon.   
Current Chinese Premier Xi Jinping usually uses the expression of ‘community of 
common destiny’ (人類命運共同體) to refer to the Chinese approach on international affairs. This 
idea, which was delivered by the ex-Chinese Premier Hu Jintao (it first appeared in the report 
signed by Hu Jintao to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 
November 2012, where he stressed that “mankind has only one earth to live on and countries 
have only one world to share”), aims to build a new framework of international relations 
through the promotion and improvement of global governance. The only way to achieve these 
goals is through the establishment of “a new type of global development partnership that is 
more equitable and balanced, stick together in times of difficulty, both share rights and shoulder 
obligations, and boost the common interests of mankind” (CHINA DAILY). Nevertheless, this 
egalitarian vision of international relations clashes with China’s own experience, as explained 
in the next section.  
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III.3. China’s traditional concept of international relations: How does China see the rest of 
the world? 
 
After the Peace of Westphalia, the international system was built around the concept of 
nation-state 6 . During the emergence of modern Europe, the ‘Westphalian system’ has 
dominated international relations: States with equal rights, similar population and akin 
economic power. Nevertheless, the Chinese experience is far from this idea. Instead, the 
‘Tributary system’ was the basis of relations between China and the rest of regions. This idea 
arises from the fact that China was a country with an overwhelming population, and cultural, 
military and economic superiority over other countries or places. Aside from this immense size 
of China in comparison with its neighbors, the other key point was the “mutual acceptance of 
and acquiescence in Chinese superiority” (JACQUES, 2012, p. 508). China, which considered 
itself the most advanced and sophisticated civilization, used to see the rest of the world as less 
developed. In point of fact, in Mandarin Chinese, ‘China’ is translated as zhongguo (中国), which 
means ‘Middle Kingdom’. It doesn’t require a further explanation: Imperial China adopted a 
Sinocentric view of the global order, considering itself the centre of the world (JACQUES, 
2012, p. 303).  
Beijing was the epicenter of the Empire, with concentric areas that progressively moved 
from civilization to outer darkness (JACQUES, 2012, p. 304). The Yugong (禹贡), a chapter of 
the Classic of Documents (书经)7, describes the relation of different territories through five 
concentric zones emanating outwards from the capital: Dian (royal domains), Hou (princely 
domains), Sui (pacification zone), Yao (zone of allied barbarians), Huang (zone of savagery) 
(YEE, 1994, p. 76). In one of its maps, the five geographical areas are represented in rectangular 
form, according to the cosmological notion of a square earth. This Sinocentric view entailed a 
submissive attitude from barbarians to civilized China. At this point, the Middle Kingdom 
subjected the rest of the territories through a mix of culture and military power (JACQUES, 
2012, p. 304). Similarly, we can also observe the famous 1602 map called Kunyu Wanguo 
 
6 Although there are different theories that explain the defining elements of a nation (and the legitimacy and right, 
or not, of constituting its own State), it is usually considered that a nation stems from a series of elements shared 
by a population (common language, culture, history, etc.) (see SÁNCHEZ FERRIZ, 2009, p. 152). 
7 The Classic of Documents (also called ‘Book of Documents’ of ‘Classic of History’) is one of the five classics 
of ancient Chinese literature. It is dated, despite much controversy, in the sixth century BC. 
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Quantu (坤舆万国全图)8, drawn by Matteo Ricci (利玛窦)9 and its Chinese collaborators Li Zhizao 
and Zhang Wentao, in which China is located as the centre of the world. It is the oldest surviving 
map in Chinese to show the Americas and had a crucial importance in expanding Chinese 
knowledge of the world (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, 2017).  
In this context, the rise of China is somehow challenging the Westphalian system of 
nation-states. As Chinese influence increases in the world, the approach to international 
relations could be affected by this Tributary system viewpoint. Nowadays, the majority of 
countries are aiming to strengthen their relationship with China, just as they have done for 
centuries under the Tributary system (see KANG, 2003). As evidence points out, States in East 
Asia, Africa or South America, are likely to depend on China due to financial and trade 
opportunities (see ALDEN, 2007). In this regard, what would be the result of this sphere of 
influence for international relations is one of the greatest questions of our time. Countries 
dependency is important to understand the future of international relations. For example, in 
Brazil's case, where China is the first trade partner, the partnership between both countries 
“goes beyond economic interests”, and it “will deeply influence how Brazilian society is likely 
to evolve and change in the next decades” (FERREIRA & ALBUQUERQUE, 2013). However, 
tensions with other parts of the world (such as the USA-China tariff war) are also decisive. 
Although it seems unlikely that international organizations shift from the one-country-one-vote 
system to a new system where countries do not have same rights, the likelihood that the current 
system will be influenced by the international relations Tributary system framework is high. To 
some extent, this Chinese international attitude will impact the current Westphalian system. For 
this reason, it is important to analyze the most significant differences between the Chinese 
civilization and the Western one, in order to figure out the way in which China could alter some 
notions of the international order.  
 
III.4. China differs from the West: Civilization and State 
 
 
8 Also called ‘Map of the Myriad Countries’, ‘Mappamondo’ or ‘The Impossible Black Tulip’. In addition to this 
model, there are five more known complete examples of the 1602 printing (Vatican Apostolic Library Collection 
I; Japan Kyoto University Collection; Collection of Japan Miyagi Prefecture Library; Collection of the Library of 
the Japanese Cabinet; private collection in Paris).  
9 Matteo Ricci (1553-1610) was a Jesuit missionary that arrived China in 1583. He established the first Christian 
mission in China. He is considered one of the founders of the Catholic Church in China and his contributions to 
bring Chinese culture to the West are of transcendental importance. In opposite direction, he brought Western 
culture closer to China, coining non-existent terms in Mandarin Chinese at that time, such as God (上帝) or Heaven 
(天).  
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In relation to Chinese goals in international relations, some authors like Graham Allison 
have argued that rising powers develop an increasing pride and demand more influence and 
respect. According to this view, the established power tends to be insecure and fearful due to 
the emerging power challenge, and the natural reaction is to get defensive. Within this 
psychological atmosphere, slight misunderstandings are magnified. Small issues that would be 
solved without problem in other situations could led to large conflicts and even to war. And, in 
the case of the USA and China, these differences could be even worse due to the contrast 
between civilizations (ALLISON, 2017b). This is the reason to analyze in this section the main 
civilizational differences between China and the West in relation to the way the State is 
conceived: If we understand these differences, we can figure out more precisely how China 
could impact the global order.  
Therefore, there are main concepts that we should bear in mind while talking about 
Chinese civilization. First of all, China is not a nation-state but a civilization-state. This means 
that, unlike what happens in Europe, China represents a whole civilization under one State 
(JACQUES, 2012, p. 287). The notion of civilization should not be considered as a mere culture 
characteristic of a particular time or place, but as a unique complex system that differs from 
other kind of simpler societies, and that it is distinguished by their means of subsistence, types 
of livelihood, forms of government, social stratification, economic systems, or literacy, among 
others (see GORDON CHILDE, 2016). Although the concept of civilization is a matter of 
controversy between sociologists and globalization is challenging the traditional definition, 
however, it is a widely accepted fact the recognition of the existence of different civilizations 
along History (Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, Mesoamerican, Arabian, Roman and 
Greece, etc.). In this sense, a fair comparison would be that between China and the whole 
Europe, as a Western civilization, under one State (taking in account that even in that situation, 
China doubles the population of Europe). It would not be symmetrical to compare China with 
a nation-state such as Spain, France or Italy. These nation-states should be compared with 
Chinese provinces such as Hebei (河北, 75 million people), Shandong (山东, 100 million people) 
or Guangdong (广东, 114 million people).  
Secondly, the idea of State in China differs significantly from the Western way of 
thinking about it. The Chinese State is not considered as something external from individuals 
which should be limited in order to enjoy more individual freedom (as the liberal vision has 
traditionally considered). The State is seen as the paterfamilias of the civilization. Is the 
guardian of Chinese culture and values, enjoying “something akin to a spiritual significance” 
(JACQUES, 2012, p. 266). To the extent that the State is able to promote and defend Chinese 
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culture, it enjoys legitimacy. In this regard, sovereignty resides in the State itself rather than in 
people. Popular sovereignty was replaced by State sovereignty (see YONGNIAN, 1999). This 
is radically different to what happens in the West. Under a traditional Western vision, the State 
enjoys legitimacy if it respects two pillars: Democracy & Rule of Law, and Human Rights. 
Only if the State is democratic and does respect Human Rights, people grant legitimacy to it 
(see SAPHIRO, 2012). And, in any event, in Western States sovereignty resides with the 
people, not with the State.    
Not only is the idea of State or its legitimacy dissimilar, but the way to understand the 
relation between individuals and the State. Whilst in Europe rebellions and revolutions have 
not been uncommon during most part of its history, respect for the State has been the general 
rule in Chinese history (although this idea has been countered by different authors - see 
CALLAHAN, 2016, p. 2). The State in China is contemplated as the embodiment of 
civilization. For this reason, any attack to it is considered as a direct attack to Chinese culture. 
The Chinese State, conceived as the guardian of Chinese culture and values, enjoys high 
authority and legitimacy (JACQUES, 2012, p. 266). Research has revealed high social 
acceptance of the Government and the State among Chinese society. For example, this is case 
of the Democracy Perception Index (DPI) 2018 (an annual research project conducted by Dalia 
Research, in collaboration with the Alliance of Democracies and Rasmussen Global, to measure 
citizens’ trust in Governments). This study was published in June 2018 and was based on 
125,000 surveys conducted around fifty different countries. It concludes that there is a lower 
percentage of people in China who feel their Government ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ acts in their interest 
than in the USA, the UK or Spain (see Figure 5). In the same way, the percentage of Chinese 
that feel the voice of people ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ matters in politics is lower than that of 
Americans, British or Spanish, once again (see Figure 6). China, despite being a non-democratic 
State, enjoys higher levels of satisfaction with the Government than many Western countries, 
as the DPI findings point out10. 
 
10 Although the data in the above-mentioned report are clear, scientific rigor requires us to take them with caution. 
There are several factors that must be taken into account when analyzing the DPI's conclusions, such as the fact 
that most Chinese have never known any other system, so they do not have complete information to be able to 
compare. Moreover, the media in China is more biased than in the West, so propaganda has a key role in shaping 
society. And it should also be noted that in the West the critical spirit is precisely a consequence of freedom.  
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Figure 5. Survey – Do you feel that your 
government is acting in your interest? 
     
Figure 6: Survey – Do you feel that the voice 
of people like you matter in politics?
 




BJIR, Marília, v. 10, n. 2, p. 436-464, maio/ago. 2021. 
 
In order to develop Chinese culture, unity is essential. Historical examples have stressed 
that when power was centripetal (with a strong Chinese Government and a united China), the 
experience has been positive. On the other hand, when power was centrifugal, China has 
suffered (as evidenced during the so-called century of humiliation, from 1839 to 1949). This is 
why unity is on the top of the scale of values. Its importance is deeper than freedom, which is 
the idea that inspires Western States. In this respect, individual rights in China are below 
collective rights (PÉREZ AYALA, 2005, p. 55). The community, as an extension of family, is 
more important than individuals. In relation to unity, political stability has also a great weight 
in Chinese politics (JACQUES, 2012, p. 264). Deng Xiaoping, in line with Confucian thinking, 
was in no doubt about its significance: “[China’s] modernization needs two prerequisites. One 
is international peace, and the other is domestic political stability […]. A crucial condition of 
China’s progress is political stability” (recovered from YONGNIAN, 2004).  
The importance of unity in Chinese culture can be observed in the language. Whereas in 
English or Spanish we use different words for ‘State’ (Estado, in Spanish), ‘country’ (país, in 
Spanish) and ‘nation’ (nación, in Spanish), in Mandarin Chinese they use the word guojia (国家
) for all these concepts. ‘Country’, ‘State’ and ‘nation’ are closely connected ideas. Mandarin 
Chinese uses largely the same characters for all of them, which are part of the same notion. In 
addition, the Government is the top representative of the State. In this regard, the Communist 
Party monopolizes the Government, and therefore the State. For this reason, as mentioned 
above, an attack to the Government or to the CPC is conceived as a direct attack to their nation. 
However, unlike Western democracies, the Government does not have different ideologies 
depending on who leads the country. Although there might be different views on particular 
topics, individuals are always under the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义
) political theory. This way of organizing the political system leads to a more perdurable and 
consistent idea of Government.  
In the same line, another language fact that represents very accurately the importance of 
unity in the Chinese civilization is the idea of nationality. The Chinese Constitution embraces 
two different concepts. On the one hand, the nationality without capacity of constituting a 
different State (民族 minzu). And, on the other hand, the idea of nationality (国籍 guoji) as the 
relationship with the country (国家 guojia). This last notion, under a Western vision, is associated 
with the sovereign nation and its capacity of constituting a State. Therefore, ethnic groups in 
China own that kind of non-sovereign nationality (民族 minzu), but not that kind of nationality 
with the capacity of constituting a different State (国籍 guoji). Neither in English nor in Spanish 
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do we use different words for these ideas. We use ‘nationality’ for both concepts, even though 
it is a controversial constitutional concept. A classic example could be that of Spain: The current 
1978 Constitution recognizes something similar to a minzu to Catalonia, but not guoji, which 
would entail the famous self-determination right.  
Nevertheless, despite the importance of unity in Chinese culture, there is a great 
heterogeneity in many fields: ethnic minorities11, cuisines, languages... Even more, there are 
large political differences, for example, between citizens in Hong Kong and those of the 
Mainland China. Precisely, the safeguard of unity is the element that permits to overcome these 
differences. In other words, the Communist Party accepted the “one country, two systems” 
principle so as not to lose Hong Kong. In order to guarantee unity, different political and 
economic systems were accepted within the same State (which is unconceivable in Western 
systems - no Western State admits the possibility of embracing different political and economic 
systems within it). This fact reinforces the idea of civilization-state, as opposed to that of nation-
state. 
In addition, the authority of the Chinese State is endorsed by its historical experience 
regarding the lack of division of the decision-making capacity. It is true that during several 
epochs the Emperor have depended on a huge bureaucracy and, during Han dynasty for 
example, the distribution of power with the Chancellor had been one of the greatest problems 
in the Chinese governance (MU, 2000, p. 3). However, at least during the last millennium, the 
Emperor never shared power with other entities, such as the nobility, the Church or 
businesspeople (JACQUES, 2012, p. 260). Moreover, Confucian ideas established as desirable 
that participation in politics should correspond only to an elite and not to the rest of social strata. 
The coexistence of different sources of authority was regarded as ethically wrong. Participation 
in politics, however, entitled a high moral requirement (PYE, 1992, p. 24-25). Indeed, this 
perception of limited political involvement lasts until today. Chinese people don’t crave after 
active participation in politics. In China (with the exception of Hong Kong and Macao), 
democracy is not a social demand according to the DPI 2019 (see Figure 7). Despite the 
authoritarian character of the State, Chinese people seek democracy to a less extent than people 
in most part of Western countries. As highlighted before, satisfaction with the Government in 
China is high. For this reason, democracy demands in Mainland China are almost non-existent. 
Nevertheless, what would happen if China suffers an economic breakdown? Would respect for 
 
11  According to official Chinese Government statistics 
(http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/china_abc/2014/08/27/content_281474983873388.htm), in addition to Han 
majority, there are 55 ethnic minority groups (that compromises near 8% of the mainland population).  
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the State and all the theoretical ideas explained above outweigh a decreasing economic output? 
I believe this is one of the most important questions for China’s future and one of the main 
concerns of the Communist Party in order to preserve power. Only time will give us the answer. 
 
 
Figure 7. Survey – Where do people around the world want more democracy? 
Source: Democracy Perception Index 2019 – Dalia Research (https://daliaresearch.com/democracy/) 
 
Finally, another extremely important aspect to understand the idea of State in China in 
relation to the West is the way in which time is considered. Unlike the West, where progress is 
the horizon, China has had a continuous culture for five millennia (in contrast, the USA was 
constituted only 250 years ago). Continuity of the legacy and repetition are key features in their 
civilization 12 . China has a meaning in time and history. For this reason, the Chinese 
Government distinguish the immediate measures from the structural ones (ALLISON, 2017). 
In this sense, the nature of the Chinese system fosters a long-term thinking, unlike many 
Western democracies, where Governments seem to focus only in short-term concerns (in most 
cases, until next elections). The Communist Party, at least since Mao’s death, is above 





12  This point is clearly appreciated in the business world: while Western companies were characterized by 
innovation, Chinese companies were characterized by copying. However, this have changed radically, and Chinese 
firms are currently developing new technologies and investing heavily in R&D. For example, in the smartphones 
market, some of the largest companies are Chinese (such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Vivo or Lenovo).  
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The time of a unipolar world led so far by the United States has passed. The world moves 
forward to the next step. However, whether this new global order will look as a non-polar world 
(where several regional powers coexist without colliding with each other) or as a multipolar 
world (with different superpowers competing with each other) remains unknown. There are two 
main Western approaches on the rise of China under an international relations theoretical 
framework. On the one hand, offensive realists argue that China will challenge the current 
system and that the Asian country might create a new architecture of international organizations 
according to its own view of the world. These authors cite examples such as the conflicts in 
South China Sea, the expansion of Chinese state-controlled firms, the new Belt and Road 
Initiative and its surrounding institutions, or the leadership role played during the coronavirus 
crisis. On the other hand, liberal internationalists suggest that, even though the world order 
could be modified to some extent, the liberal system will resist because China will adapt itself 
to Western norms. These authors cite China’s membership of the WTO or its increasing 
cooperative attitude in the UN Security Council.   
In the same line, there are two main narratives supported by Chinese experts. The official 
discourse, endorsed primarily by the current President Xi Jinping, states that China's peaceful 
rise will reinforce cooperation between countries, helping to strengthen the common interests 
of humankind. However, other authors defend that China has the moral duty to model global 
institutions to better represent the interests of emerging powers and the non-West, thus taking 
a more aggressive approach.  
In view of the facts, it seems clear that China’s shift in foreign policy responds to a new 
pro-active attitude towards international affairs. China has put the ‘bide and hide’ low-profile 
strategy aside. The establishment of international financial institutions, such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank or the Silk Road Fund, are proof of this new position. 
Nevertheless, China’s traditional vision of international order is different from the Western one. 
Whereas the current international system was created according to the Westphalian system of 
nation-states, where multilateral relations between countries are based on equal rights and 
obligations, the ‘Tributary system’ was the pattern for relations between China and the rest of 
regions. This concept of international relations arises from the fact that China was a country 
with an overwhelming population and cultural, military and economic superiority over other 
countries or places. The ‘Tributary system’ was based on unequal bilateral relations between 
China and the rest of regions, which were regarded as less developed.  
It is unlikely that countries’ attitudes in international relations shift radically from the 
Westphalian system, especially within international organizations (which are based on the 
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principle of one country, one vote) to the Tributary system. However, to some extent, this 
Chinese view of the international order will impact the current Westphalian system. In this 
regard, regional integration initiatives (such as the European Union) are desirable for nation-
states in order to establish equal relations with China. For example, let's think in France or 
Spain trying to reach a particular trade agreement with China if the EU did not exist. What 
position of strength in the negotiation would either of the two countries have?  
In order to figure out the way in which China could alter the international order, this 
research has studied the most significant differences between Chinese and Western models of 
State. First, China is not a Western-style nation-state but a civilization-state. That is, it unifies 
under the same State an entire civilization. Therefore, symmetric relationships would be those 
between China and a State that knits together the whole Europe, and not those between China 
and Portugal, Spain or France. These European States should be compared with Chinese 
provinces such as Hebei (75 million people), Shandong (100 million people) or Guangdong 
(114 million people), for example. 
In line with the above, the Government in China is not conceived as a foreign agent whose 
power must be limited, as traditionally understood by liberal positions in the West, but rather 
as the pinnacle of its civilization. In other words, the guardian of its culture and the promoter 
of Chinese values. As a consequence, an attack on the Chinese State is akin to an attack on the 
Chinese civilization itself. In this context, the social acceptance of the Government is very high. 
According to data presented in this study, the level of satisfaction of Chinese society with 
Chinese Government is higher than that of Western societies with Western Governments. It is 
true that some elements could help to understand the context of these results, such as the fact 
that most Chinese have not experienced other political systems beyond the CCP dictatorship, 
or that foreign news has a higher level of control and censorship than in Western systems. 
However, the data are still very revealing. 
In China, the sovereignty of the State does not come from the people but lies in the State 
itself. The legitimacy granted to the Government is not based on Democracy or respect for 
Human Rights. Legitimacy comes from the ability of the Government to maintain the unity of 
the State and promote Chinese values. Therefore, individual liberties are subject to this general 
interest. The Chinese Government has social acceptance to limit individual rights and freedoms 
if those measures help to safeguard Chinese culture. Freedom is not at the top of the scale of 
values that the Government should protect and promote, as in Western systems. Unity is the 
most important value. The notion of Government is endorsed by its historical experience 
regarding the lack of division of the decision-making capacity during centuries, in addition to 
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the high morality expected from politicians and the long-term thinking that characterizes 
Chinese politics.  
All these features represent significant differences between China and the West. 
According to authors such as Graham Allison, established powers tend to be insecure and 
fearful about emerging powers, and the natural reaction is to get defensive. Within this 
psychological atmosphere, slight misunderstandings are magnified. Small issues that would be 
solved without problem in other situations could led to large conflicts and even to war. And, in 
the case of the United States and China, misunderstandings could be even worse due to the 
contrast between civilizations. As explained in this research, these differences are especially 
important in three fields: the model of State, the way both civilizations understand individual 
rights and freedoms, and the vision on international relations (Westphalian system vs. 
‘Tributary system’).  
In the context of China’s rise, due to its economic and geopolitical development, what 
would happen with the Western Democracy & Rule of Law - Capitalism - Human Rights 
paradigm fostered by the established international system is another significant question. 
However, at least two main successive conditions would be necessary in order to change this 
paradigm: first, to create a new architecture of international organizations based on different 
values. Second, to actively promote Chinese values and China’s society model among 
developing countries through its international influence. Even if China creates a new 
international system (through new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Bank or the Silk 
Road Fund), it would have to exercise a kind of attraction power towards developing countries. 
This attraction power should not be generated only through the so-called soft power (such as 
the politics followed by those recently created international organizations or cultural influence) 
but also through trade influence.  
In this regard, whereas the West promotes democratic values while trading with other 
countries, China does not interfere in the political internal affairs of other countries, focusing 
mainly on the economic aspects of the agreements (although this doesn't mean that Chinese 
companies are not privileged in those trade agreements). For example, in the financial sphere, 
China usually lend money without demanding democratic reforms. In this context, China could 
meet the first condition (creation of an alternative international system), but not the second one 
(promotion of that newly created international system). Therefore, it is unlikely that China will 
create a new global paradigm supported by a new international system for developing States.  
Nevertheless, different situation would be that were developing countries imitate motu 
propio China’s society model, instead of the Democracy & Rule of Law - Capitalism - Human 
 
BJIR, Marília, v. 10, n. 2, p. 436-464, maio/ago. 2021. 
Rights paradigm promoted by the West. In this case, if China becomes the model for emerging 
countries, those paradigmatic ideas of Western societies could become blurred and not continue 
to expand. Or, in a similar situation, developing countries could stop applying that Western 
model because no financial institution is demanding such reforms (due to the fact that these 
countries are now asking for money from China, which doesn't demand reforms), and simply 
develop their own traditional paradigms, without taking the Western model into account. In any 
case, what is clear is that China will alter somehow the Western paradigm. However, to what 
extent or what the new paradigm would be, in such a case, are questions that only time will 
answer.  
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